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3.3(b)(1)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3.5(c) ---------- BT

(S// DIST: 09 NOVEMBER 1984

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: COMMENTS 3.3(b)(1)

ON ADMINISTRATION-ARMED FORCES RELATIONS AND ON ARMED FORCES VIEWS OF THE ADMINISTRATION

3.3(b)(1)

SUMMARY: 3.3(b)(1)

THE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) ARE WAGING PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT IN AN EFFORT TO BLUNT WHAT THE FFAA SEE AS AN ADMINISTRATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES. AFTER DISCUSSING THE FEELINGS AND ATTITUDES IN THE FFAA TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1) SEVERAL STEPS IN THE FFAA'S CAMPAIGN, AND EVENTUALLY, THE FFAA MIGHT CONSIDER "DIRECT ACTION" -- ATTACKS -- AGAINST THE ARGENTINE LEFT. FFAA PERSONNEL BELIEVE THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IS WORKING. 3.3(b)(1)

TEXT: 1. 3.3(b)(1)

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THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES (FFAA) ARE WAGING A SERIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERN- 3.3(b)(1)
MENT OF PRESIDENT RAUL ((ALFONSIN)) IN AN EFFORT TO BLUNT,
3.3(b)(1) AS FFAA PERSONNEL SEE IT, THE ADMINISTRATION'S CAM- 3.3(b)(1)
PAIGN AGAINST THE ARMED FORCES. THE
FFAA INTEND THESE ACTIONS TO HARASS THE ADMINISTRATION AND
TO PERSUADE THE GOVERNMENT THAT, IN ITS HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
IT SHOULD NOT IMPLICATE THE FFAA IN CRIMES, AS MANY ARMED
FORCES PERSONNEL BELIEVE IT IS DOING.

3.3(b)(1) 2. STRONG FEELINGS EXIST IN THE ARMED
FORCES TO THE EFFECT THAT, SINCE ITS INAUGURATION, THE ADMIN-
ISTRATION HAS USED THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE TO TAKE THE MINDS
OF THE PEOPLE OFF THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF ARGENTIA,
A VIEW WHICH IS NOT CORRECT; BUT MANY 3.3(b)(1)
FFAA PEOPLE AND MANY RIGHTISTS DO BELIEVE THAT THE ALFONSIN
CN GOVERNMENT IS FOLLOWING THIS KIND OF A STRATEGY. 3.3(b)(1)
AFTER ALMOST A YEAR, FFAA PERSONNEL HAVE
TIRED OF, IN THEIR PERCEPTION, BEARING THE BRUNT OF A GOVERN-
3.3(b)(1) MENT ATTACK. MANY ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL ARE IN-
CENSED BY THE RECENT PUBLICATION BY THE MAGAZINE "EL PERIODISTA"
OF THE NAMES OF OVER 1,300 PEOPLE WHO, THE MAGAZINE CLAIMED,
WERE ACCUSED OF CRIMES IN THE REPORT OF THE NOW-DISBANDED
NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE DISAPPEARANCES OF PERONS (CONADEP). 3.3(b)(1)
MANY FFAA PEOPLE VIEW "EL PERIODISTA'S"
PUBLICATION OF THE NAMES AS, IN HIS WORDS, "THE LAST STRAW";
3.3(b)(1) DID NOT EXPAND ON THIS REMARK. COMMENT: DESPITE 3.3(b)(1)
PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY, 3.3(b)(1)
"EL PERIODISTA" DID INDEED REPRODUCE
ACCURATELY THE LIST OF NAMES WHICH APPEARED IN THE CONADEP
REPORT. THE SOURCE WHICH MADE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO
THE MAGAZINE IS NOT YET KNOWN TO PRESIDENCY OFFICIALS, BUT
FFAA PERSONNEL BELIEVE THE ADMINISTRATION DELIBERATELY LEAKED
THE NAMES TO THE MAGAZINE.)

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3. RETURNING TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIONS OF THE FFAA AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMED FORCES INCLUDES THE FOLLOWING STEPS: 3.3(b)(1)

A. INCREASING FFAA CONTACTS IN SUCH MINISTRIES AS DEFENCE, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND WORSHIP, AND INTERIOR.

B. ENCOURAGING MAJOR GENERAL (MF) RICARDO ((PIANTA)), CHIEF OF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF, AND ARMY LIEUTENANT GENERAL (LTG) JULIO ALFREDO ((FERNANDEZ)) TORRES, CHIEF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, TO EXPLAIN TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS THE CONCERNS OF THE FFAA IN REGARD TO THE TONE AND IMPACT OF ANTI-ARMED FORCES SENTIMENTS THAT COME FROM SEVERAL QUARTERS.

C. SEEKING MEDIA INTERVIEWS FOR SENIOR ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN ORDER TO GET FFAA VIEWS INTO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

3.3(b)(1) 4. THE FFAA INTEND THESE STEPS TO EXERT INDIRECT PRESSURE ON THE ADMINISTRATION. THE CAMPAIGN WOULD BE CONSISTENT AND CONSTANT. THAT, LATER, THE FFAA MIGHT CONSIDER "DIRECT ACTION," WHICH COULD INCLUDE ATTACKS ON ARGENTINE LEFTISTS OR ON OFFICES ASSOCIATED WITH THE LEFT. 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1) 5. FAA PERSONNEL BELIEVE THAT THEIR PSYCHOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IS WORKING. THEY COULD CITE AS INDICATIONS THAT THEIR EFFORTS ARE AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION THE RECENT PUBLIC COMMENTS BY MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR ANTONIO ((TROCCOLI)) AND BY SUBSECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR RAUL ((GALVAN)) -- BOTH OF WHOM DEFENDED ADMINISTRATION POLICIES TOWARD THE FFAA AND DISCOUNTED THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT -- AND A RECENT REFERENCE BY PRESIDENT ALFONSIN TO THE NEED OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO HAVE THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES. 3.3(b)(1)

3.3(b)(1) 6. (COMMENT: THERE PROBABLY EXISTS NO MORE ANTI-GOVERNMENT SENTIMENT IN THE FFAA NOW THAN THERE DID ON THE DAY THE ADMINISTRATION WAS INAUGURATED. COMMENTS BY FFAA OFFICERS ABOUT THE ILLS OF THE ADMINISTRATION AND ABOUT THE NEED TO CORRECT THE PROBLEMS WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BROUGHT TO THE COUNTRY -- "FRAGATEANDO," IN ARGENTINE SLANG

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-- BEGAN ON INAUGURATION DAY AND WILL CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE ADMINISTRATION GOVERNS. FROM THIS POINT THROUGH THE COMMING VACATION PERIOD, COMPLAINTS FROM THE FFAA PROBABLY WILL NOT INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY. IN MARCH OR APRIL 1985, FFAA PERSONNEL WILL LOOK TO THE ADMINISTRATION TO BEGIN RE-BUILDING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE ARMED FORCES AND TO BEGIN REBUILDING THE MORALE AND SPRIT DE CORPS OF THE FFAA. THE COMING YEAR COULD BE THE MOST SIGNIFICANT YEAR FOR THE AD-MINISTRATION IN REGARD TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE FFAA: IT WILL BE THE TIME FOR THE ADMINISTRATION TO REPAIR THE WOUNDS IN-FLICTED ON THE FFAA -- OR THE ADMINISTRATION WILL HAVE TO FACE A VERY ANGERED OPPOSITION FORCE.)

3.3(b)(1)

WARNING: REPORT CLASS S E C R E T-WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED 3.5(c)

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